A Victory for the People: Shuster is Scrapping A4A’s ATC Privatization Scheme

Yesterday, Congressman Bill Shuster, chairman of the U.S. House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, announced he is abandoning his multi-year push (going back to at least 2015) aimed at privatizing the U.S. ATC system. The idea was sold as a way to remove roughly 35,000 employees from federal service, but many saw that in fact, the idea was just a way to give more leverage to the airlines and other corporate interests.

This is a big victory for all of us who want FAA to stop being a captured agency, a faux-regulator that fails to serve people while serving only aviation commerce.

Below is an archived compilation of various news articles with the announcement. The actual Press Release has not yet been posted at Congressman Shuster’s website.

Click on the image below for a scrollable view; the PDF file may be downloaded.

See also this earlier aiReform content:

Who is to Blame – and Who Can Fix – the Impacts Around U.S. Hub Airports?

A recent news article out of Phoenix [KPHX] shows that both FAA and local officials are again ‘collaborating’ to screw over residents impacted by NextGen routes. Click here to view an archived copy with aiReform comments.

What I find most distressing about this article is it shows the real intent of the so-called settlement between FAA and local officials. FAA plainly lost when their case was finally heard at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit (USCADC). A responsible federal agency, actually serving the public (instead of just industry), would have accepted the court decision and promptly acted to correct their errors. Instead, FAA lawyers pressed local officials to compromise, to effectively defang the court decision … thus rendering the court meaningless. They crafted a deal that only perpetuates and expands the root problem: real people impacted by aviation have been shut out from having any voice, any local control, to protect their homes and communities.

An Analysis

When neighborhoods (and health) are being ruined by excessive airport scheduling, who is to blame? And, who can fix the problems?

With or without legal action,[1] there is always a small collection of ‘parties’ involved, including:

  • Elected officials (local, and federal)
  • FAA – the federal ‘regulator’ created to serve the public, funded by the public, but inordinately serving industry
  • Local/state administrative officials
  • Airlines (and other industry players)
  • Real people: impacted neighbors/residents, as well as locals who use aviation services

What role does each party play, and how are these parties interconnected? At the federal level, our elected officials have been lobbied by industry to create laws – including fee/tax systems – that shift the balance of power amongst parties. FAA, a captured regulator serving industry, then processes these laws into regulations, always with a bias that benefits the airlines. At the heart of these laws and regulations, Congress and FAA are stealing away local control. The effect is that the airlines, along with FAA, have evolved into a sovereign alien, occupying not just the sprawling airport lands but also the air above our homes. Real people – in homes, in city halls, and even in the governor’s mansion – have no meaningful powers to mitigate these absentee landlords who are indifferent about how their decisions trend their status toward ‘slumlord’.

That’s the core of it: No local control. Congress and FAA have created administrative sovereignty for an invasive and metastasizing aviation industry.

The situation is worsened today by the extent to which human greed is being played. Even our best officials are compromised by the lobbyists who now run the show.

Increasingly, it is an extremely rare official who, after winning an election or spending decades climbing to a high level administrative position, still maintains an ability to serve people, and not money. Corporations know what they want, and lobbyists (many of whom are also earning FAA retirement pensions!) know how to spin and maneuver to achieve what the corporations want. Money makes a great hearing aid; officials who seem tone deaf to constituent concerns ALWAYS come through to serve money. Some officials go totally rogue, accepting payouts, kickbacks, and jobs for the spouse. Most bought officials are careful to remain subtle. In all cases, though, nearly all officials find it easiest to bend to the lobbyist pressures; they drink their koolaid and trust their hype, without any critical assessment. Thinking and leadership are hard work; bending is far more convenient, especially if there is personal financial gain attached. In effect, and in time, many local/state officials become captured as industry servants.

Let’s be very clear on one other thing. When a new commercial airline impact appears and/or grows, it always does so because the one or two airlines who dominate that airport are tweaking the daily flight schedule, in pursuit of profits. Those profits do NOT come from adding more air travel for local residents; no, the profits come from more intense use of the local airport as a hub for more flights. The airline tallies more ‘through-passengers’ who pass through the airport as a passenger-sorting facility; the airport authority scores more PFC taxes, to pay off more accumulated airport capital improvement debt and fund more future airport growth projects. The airport sprawls larger and noise and pollutant impacts increase, yet the aviation service benefits to local residents show no meaningful gain.

Since the airlines are profit-seeking corporations, they do everything they can to minimize the costs (including labor) when implementing these changes. Thus, the fewest possible jobs are created; in other words, while noise/health impacts may soar, the real local economic benefits are held to a minimum. The marginal costs of growing a hub schedule typically always far exceed the marginal benefits to the local economy … which is why we see so much FAA/industry collaborated propaganda, spinning the illusion of airports as massive economic engines (while conveniently ignoring the massive subsidies involved).

A Short Data Example, from San Diego:

Here’s a table with enplanement data, extracted from the 2008 airport master plan for the crowded on-runway airport in San Diego [KSAN]. Operations data has been added, from FAA’s ATADS database. Also, the year-to-year change has been calculated.

  enplanements Yr-to-Yr change Operations (ATADS) Yr-to-Yr change
2002 7,471,644 206,605
2003 7,637,193 2.2% 204,713 -0.9%
2004 8,200,687 7.4% 215,211 5.1%
2005 8,692,694 6.0% 229,192 6.5%
2006 8,759,669 0.8% 230,798 0.7%
2007 9,172,966 4.7% 237,574 2.9%

Did local demand for aviation services grow 7.4% during 2004 and another 6.0% during 2005? No. If the local population had grown at such rates than, yes, it would be reasonable to expect such large annual increases. But, in fact, the enplanements grew far in excess of population growth. So, the enplanements grew due to shifts in airline scheduling. Those shifts massively increased the number of people from elsewhere, who became counted as enplanements when they changed planes or occupied a through-seat.

San Diego is a good example to study this because it is remotely located, in a corner of the nation, and close enough to the major hub at LAX. As such, it does not have the geographically central location needed to function well as an energy-efficient hub for through-passengers, at least not for domestic trips. In fact, if you study the airport’s Competition Plan,[2] you will see that all three legacy airlines (American, Delta, and United) offer very limited flights, primarily feeding only to their major U.S. hubs. The two airlines that use KSAN for hubbing are Southwest and Alaska. Southwest is the dominant airline and feeds many passengers through KSAN with origins or destinations along the West Coast. Alaska does the same thing, but Alaska’s hubbing is mostly to serve passengers vacationing at numerous Mexican destinations. If FAA wanted to minimize impacts on the local community at this very congested airport, they would remove the current incentives to use KSAN as a through-hub. If congressional officials wanted to help, they too would remove the current incentives, by pushing for changes in the laws that have defined the current problematic fee and tax system. If local officials wanted to serve impacted local residents, they would at least advocate, demanding FAA and Congress take these actions.

Some might suggest these growth figures do not reflect airline scheduling strategies, but instead reflect a recovery from 9/11. This is not the case. It is absolutely true that, across the U.S., enplanements and operations dropped after 9/11. But, two other truths also exist: (1) at all but the biggest hub airports, airline activity growth rates were already starting to decline in 2000;[3] and (2) the bulk of the recovery was completed in 2003. In other words, if FAA applied its resources to objectively study the data and report it to the public, FAA itself would prove that, by the end of 2003, the real people residing in and near San Diego had fully resumed their local consumption of aviation services. An uncaptured federal regulator writing such a report would confirm: the growth in impacts upon the local community are solely due to FAA’s accommodation of airline scheduling; more through-passengers means more profits … and more impacts.

What does this analysis mean, for resolving aviation impacts?

It all comes down to airline schedule changes for which marginal impacts increase far more than marginal benefits.[4] The impacts are increasing because the Av-Gov Complex is a machine that has airlines, FAA, and various local/state officials ‘collaborating’ to feed benefits to corporations … and this very same machine is screwing over the people. There is no local control. Instead, we have predictable choreography, with Av-Gov Complex players finger-pointing and claiming they are powerless, with zero accountability as impacts continue to worsen.

People want aviation services, but they also want (and need!) local control.

Since 2012, when Delta announced a new hub expansion at Sea-Tac [KSEA], all airport metrics have grown enormously (annual operations, enplanements, fuel consumption, air cargo tonnage). But so too have grown the many problems that both FAA and Port of Seattle take no action to fix: noise impacts, air pollutant impacts, arrival congestion forcing delays even at cruise altitude, road congestion for Seattle-area access to the airport terminal, even lengthy tarmac delays simply because the airlines are allowed to schedule in excess of existing gate capacity. The ongoing non-performance by FAA and Port of Seattle, and their bias toward accommodating airline greed, is shameful.

If O’Hare [KORD] scaled back to half its operations, would the Chicago area still be amply served with excellent service across the globe? Absolutely. And, at the same time, would impacts upon neighborhoods to the east and west be reduced? Yes, and to an astonishingly positive degree (as would national system delays).

Is the same true at other major hub airports? Yes. All of the communities where summer barbeques are destroyed (the food just doesn’t smell right, when the air smells like jet fuel), where incessant and repetitive noise patterns deny the restorative powers of nature or enjoying backyard play, where sleep is lost to accommodate loud early-morning cargo flights … all of these communities want their local airport to provide local services. But, these residents also want (and need!) local control, so that the scale of airport development and airline scheduling does not end up destroying health and quality of life.

The problems are not just at Phoenix, San Diego, Seattle and Chicago. While most U.S. airports continue to scale back (this is a shrinking industry), there is a small handful of other airports where one or two airlines want to grow more hubbing profits. To enable this, FAA’s NextGen implementation is plowing down residential quality of ([KBOS], [KJFK], [KLGA], [KBWI], [KDCA], [KCLT], and [KSFO] are all on that list).

Solutions will not happen, so long as the co-conspirators continue to conspire. The problems are local, and the best people to define and resolve the problems are the local residents. We are long overdue for the restoration of REAL LOCAL CONTROL, even (and especially!) at our largest hub airports.

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[1] It is also important to understand: the legal actions, such as the case heard when Phoenix sued FAA, are not full-fledged lawsuits where a plaintiff can force corrections and payment of damages; these are practically administrative hearings, as they are directed (by Congress) to be filed under a very short time limit, to the USCADC, which has a long history of bias favoring corporations, federal agencies, and other status quo powers. If Congress cared to protect citizen rights, we would be granted far more latitude, to pick more favorable court venues.

[2] One of the more interesting details within this Competition Plan is at pages 11-12; it is there noted that KSAN offers direct scheduled passenger flights to 56 destinations, but 47 of those are served by only ONE airline. Routes are thus 84% monopoly-flown.

[3] FAA ATADS data shows that KSAN commercial operations peaked in 1995 (219K), then dropped every year, bottoming out at 191K ops in 2000. In 2001, when airports were totally shut down for days, KSAN commercial ops actually INCREASED to 192K. Fifteen years later, the 2016 commercial ops had retreated 2.9%, to 186K; also, between 2001 and 2016, declines in TOTAL airport ops were even steeper, down 4.8%.

[4] Significantly, too, while the benefits accrue solely to the non-resident airline corporation, the costs accrue to the local residents. This cost-shift is a taking.

1990 vs 2005 vs 2016 Operations: Exposing FAA’s Inaccurate Forecasts

While doing some online research and archiving of older FAA documents, I ran into a copy of FAA’s 1993 Aviation System Capacity Plan. (click here for an archived copy of the 389-page document). Within this document, Table A-3 offered a detailed assessment of the 100 busiest towered airports, including operations in 1990 and forecasts for 2005.

The table below was created using the 1990 operations levels and 2005 forecast data for those 100 airports. But, it goes much further. It includes the actual operations counts as they happened in 2005. AND, it includes data showing how the operations counts evolved between 2005-2016.

Take a close look. This data explains why people are suffering so much at a few key FAA airports: KSEA, KJFK, KDCA, KBOS, KSFO and others.

Click on the image below for a scrollable view; the PDF file may be downloaded.

It is extremely revealing, showing how FAA consistently forecasts far beyond what would reasonably follow … almost as if the FAA forecasts are not intended to be accurate, but instead are created to sell excessive airport development while also enhancing Congressional funding support.

A more in-depth aiReform analysis follows on page two.

Is Trump ‘Reloading the Swamp’?

It is good to see Administrator Huerta move along, though it would have been much nicer to see the President fire him a year ago.

Now, as to who will be heading FAA(?)… …well, it looks like the AvGov Complex powers-that-be are not trying to change the current game plan. Here is a clip from a recent article, with a short bio of acting Administrator Dan Elwell:

“Elwell was FAA assistant administrator for policy, planning and environment from 2006 to 2008. He was Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) VP-civil aviation from 2008 to 2013 and Airlines for America (A4A) SVP-safety, security and operations from 2013 to 2015.”

For airlines and lobbyists, Elwell has all the right plumage; his record suggests he is a revolving door swamp monster, and an industry loyalist. Not likely to be focused on making FAA accountable to the thousands whose homes and health are being destroyed by NextGen.

Click here to view source article at ATWonline.com, or here to view an archived copy, with some analysis footnoted by aiREFORM.

See also:
  • 5/15/2014 – (the Federal Register revision to ATSAP that stops citizens from using FOIA to learn about aviation safety failures … signed by Mr. Huerta.)
  • 8/19/2013 – (detailed letter opposing FAA’s proposal to hide ATSAP data from the General Public (7-pages plus a 4-page attachment)
  • 4/3/2008 – (full-day congressional hearing about FAA whistleblowers, and FAA management that not only works to stop safety actions, but also works to punish the whistleblowers.)
  • 2/15/2015 – (‘What’s all the Noise about Airport Noise?’, a 7-page slideshow presentation by Mr. Burleson)
  • 1/11/2018 – (FAA’s online bio, Dan Elwell)
  • 1/11/2018 – (FAA’s online bio, Carl Burleson)

Reflections on FAA as a Faux-Regulator Serving Industry, Not the Public

At year end, we often take time to reflect. This year, let’s reflect on precisely what it means, when a U.S. federal agency is ‘captured’ by industry, so as to serve the industry instead of the larger Public. This Post will look more closely at FAA later, but for now, to help see how serious the regulatory capture problem is, let’s look at another failing U.S. federal agency: the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

FDA, just like FAA, has many responsibilities. For example, they are charged by Congress to regulate pharmaceutical companies. Additionally, Congress has funded FDA with the intent that they will be effective, working to protect public health from dangerous new drugs. One of those drugs, released two decades ago, is the addictive opioid, OxyContin. An online search reveals a jaw-dropping epidemic of addictions – and fatalities; indeed, odds are very high that everyone reading this Post knows at least one person who has been impacted by opioid addiction. Also, and not insignificantly, a deeper online research shows the fact that representatives of both major political parties have aided and abetted this epidemic, while also obstructing reforms and failing to pass overdue corrective legislation.

So, how well has FDA done their job? If agency leaders actually view their job as ‘serving customers’ such as the pharmaceutical industry, well, they’ve done a fantastic job. But, if any of us objectively assesses FDA performance from the perspective of serving the larger Public and actually protecting health, well, FDA is a total failure.

Patrick Radden Keefe recently wrote an article in The New Yorker, The Family That Built an Empire of Pain (click here to view the source article online; click here to view an archived and annotated version of the same article). Below is an excerpt that summarizes how Oxycontin legal actions are evolving; this particular excerpt primarily quotes Mike Moore, a former Mississippi State Attorney General:

… Ten states have filed suits, and private attorneys are working in partnership with dozens of cities and counties to bring others. Many public officials are furious at the makers of powerful painkillers. Prescriptions are expensive, and taxpayers often foot the bill, through programs like Medicaid. Then, as the ruinous consequences of opioid addiction take hold, the public must pay again—this time for emergency services, addiction treatment, and the like. Moore feels that the Sackler family, as the initial author and a prime beneficiary of the epidemic, should be publicly shamed. “I don’t call it Purdue. I call it the Sackler Company,” he said. “They are the main culprit. They duped the F.D.A., saying it lasted twelve hours. They lied about the addictive properties. And they did all this to grow the opioid market, to make it O.K. to jump in the water. Then some of these other companies, they saw that the water was warm, and they said, ‘O.K., we can jump in, too.’ ” There may be significant legal distinctions between a tobacco company and an opioid producer, but to Moore the ethical parallel is unmistakable: “They’re both profiting by killing people.” …

FAA as Faux-Regulator

So, how does studying this opioid epidemic, and Mr. Keefe’s article, help us to better understand FAA’s failure? Simply by showing a near-perfect analogy for the many signs of regulatory capture. Here is a short list of discernible failure patterns, the ‘symptoms’ of regulatory capture:

  • Industry becomes the primary customer. For FAA, nothing shows this failure as starkly as the whistleblower hearings held on 4/3/2008.
  • Money trumps health and environment; the faux-regulator enables industry to advance corporate profits, by assisting in expansions and system redesigns that invariably bear an enormous cost on environment, health, and local (usually residential) quality of life.
  • Consequences of failures are eventually lethal. FDA failures fuel a rise in addictions and overdoses; FAA failures sustain sleep-deprivation that cause most of today’s multi-fatal commercial accidents, such as Colgan-Buffalo, Comair-Lexington, and UPS-Birmingham.
  • Consequences of FAA failures also extend to the corruption of a culture that we are repeatedly and fraudulently told is ‘all about safety’, when the full record shows it is anything but. For example, the agency’s use of ATSAP to hide ATC safety data from the general public; the agency’s inability to see the enormous impacts imposed by NextGen changes and hub expansions; the agency’s wanton denial of obvious performance failures (such as the controller error at Santa Monica, or the rash of near-collisions at San Francisco); and of course the war against whistleblowers (those rare few inside FAA, who choose to speak up to correct the cultural failures, only to suffer retaliation).
  • Key personnel within the faux-regulator end up serving only industry, often via a revolving door. In the Oxycontin story, the key FDA regulator was earning his federal pay and building his eventual federal pension when he signed off on the fraudulent Oxycontin marketing plan; just two years later, he worked for Purdue! The same pattern happens repeatedly at FAA, all the way to the FAA Administrator position (e.g., when Marion Blakey retired, she immediately became head of a major aviation lobby firm).
  • The legal system becomes a third-party tool, used to maximize corporate advantage, an additional ‘enabler’. Both industry players and faux-regulator officials posture around threats of legal actions by industry, using this pattern as a hammer to force changes that accommodate industry, at the expense of the larger Public.
  • To protect industry greed, and to ensure the legal system will enable these failures to persist, a heavy budget is allocated to lawyers who self-enrich with what is effectively a ‘license to lie and deceive’. Not just industry-paid lawyers, but also agency lawyers, paid for by the people.
  • If and when manipulation of the legal system appears likely to fail, especially if the case is headed for trial, a ‘settlement’ suddenly appears. ALWAYS, this last-ditch legal maneuver protects both industry and faux-regulator from any accountability, by sealing records that were about to become a part of the public record, records that would among other things reveal how badly agency officials have failed. And, routinely, the so-called ‘settlement’ will include language that shuts out third parties (such as actual communities, or victim families) from future legal action.

Can This be Fixed?

Yes, it’s all fixable. And really not that difficult to do, so long as people demand performance from both agency and elected officials. The first step, though, is obvious: we have to accept that FAA, FDA and other agencies are broken, serving as faux-regulators, enabling industry players to evolve in ways that are truly destroying homes and people. Perhaps with a new year, we can get to work?

FAA’s ‘Noise Portal’: A good idea, or a way to shut down Noise Complaints?

Last November, FAA filed a statement in the Federal Register, seeking comments from the general public about a proposal for FAA to create a new ‘Noise Portal’. on the surface, it seems like a good idea, though only a good idea if FAA actually intends to collect complaints and take action to address them. But, it also seems like a TERRIBLE IDEA, if FAA’s actual intent is to force the general public to use only FAA’s ‘Noise Portal’ to pigeon-hole their growing concerns.

Here is one of the public comments, submitted by a citizen impacted near Sea-Tac:

“15 minutes per complaint????
FAA is not a regulatory agency, its a shill for the airline industry. By making it so long to file a complaint, it is just further stifling the public interest. This is ridiculous, clearly a blatant attempt to silence dissent.”

Here is a letter by the interim Executive Director at Port of Seattle. He makes some fairly good points, though those of us who know how unresponsive POS has been to area noise concerns will shake our heads, knowing there is plenty of POS hypocrisy at play here. Anyway, here is a copy of the letter, followed by a copy of a short point-by-point analysis by aiREFORM…:

Click on the image below for a scrollable view; the PDF file may be downloaded.

…and, here’s the point-by-point analysis of Mr. Soike’s letter to FAA:

Click on the image below for a scrollable view; the PDF file may be downloaded.

Click here for an archived copy of the Federal Register filing, or click here to view the source at Federal Register, which includes a link to view comments. Try and make sense of this, if you can; it appears that FAA employee Barbara Hall has a job filing multiple items with Federal Register, to solicit public comments. Oddly, though, the public comments appear to be batched together into one folder at web location, thus combining an unmanageable diversity of public comments.

NextGen Abuses at California’s Lake Arrowhead

Click here to read an archived copy of the 12/21/2017 Mountain News article by Heidi Fron (or click here to view the source article), and be sure to read the two ‘open letters’ seeking to fix these NextGen abuses! Both Jim Price and David Caine did a great job defining the impacts and articulating the need for FAA to revert to the less-impactful, pre-NextGen routes.

Here’s an embedded video of a TV news story that discusses the Lake Arrowhead impacts:

Seven months later and there has been no improvement. Just like we’ve seen around the nation: Delay – Delay – Delay.

As one more resource, click here for a brief analysis of the role of Ontario’s airport, and how NextGen changes are expanding the impacts at what is generally a fairly sleepy airport with a pair of huge runways.

To Understand NextGen, Just Follow the Money

There is nothing complicated about FAA and NextGen. Just follow the money, and recognize that FAA does not serve the people, they serve the industry, providing cover for wholesale environmental abuses that are destroying community quality of life as well as the health of many people. Very many people at FAA benefit immediately, and in retirement (with higher pensions, plus consulting or FAA-contractor gigs), with NextGen implementation. The benefits for the environment are effectively nil, and in many cases the net result is an INCREASE in impacts, solely to help the airlines shorten the flight by a minute or two.

As for the NextGen technology, well, the alleged technology changes are just a fraudulent sales pitch, oversold by FAA employees all too eager to knowingly dupe Congress and the rest of us, too. The 12/18/2017 flight mentioned by David Caine is a prime example of this fraudulent sales pitch. This cargo Boeing 767 took off from the UPS headquarters at Louisville, KY, then flew essentially a straight line (great circle route) to pick up the EAGLZ Arrival into Ontario. Here’s a screencap showing the whole route, as well as the altitude and speed profile: (source: FlightAware)

People need to understand this fact: essentially all U.S. commercial flights (cargo, as well as passenger) have been able to do these long great circle routes since the 1970s. Even before the 1970s, inertial navigation systems enabled these routes, and since then, there has been a long series of technological advances that included a heavy emphasis on aviation use of GPS navigation in the 1990s.

Think about it this way: what exactly is the efficiency gain for this particular flight, KSDF-KONT, that FAA can offer UPS? The route is already as direct as can be. The only efficiency gains are minor shortcuts for UPS, but at great cost to residents, both those near the airport in Louisville, and those under the Ontario [KONT] arrival track. People in Lousville [KSDF] suffer because ATC allows (actually, directs!) UPS to short-cut their turns right after takeoff; people at Lake Arrowhead are awakened unnecessarily because ATC allows (again, actually directs!) UPS to fly a more direct and lower ‘finish’ into KONT.

By the way, this is the case for most all commercial flights within the U.S.: so long as traffic congestion is not a factor (and congestion is not a problem for cargo flights that take off around 4AM, a key reason why the industry focuses on night flying), the system is already very efficient. The delays NextGen is supposed to help reduce happen when the airlines over-expand at a handful of hubs, and schedule far too many flights, solely to build profits. And, if we have learned anything from studying the multiple NextGen debacles, it is that these alleged ‘transformational changes’ do NOTHING to resolve airline congestion. Indeed, congestion will only be reduced if/when FAA reclaims its role as a regulator, not just an industry cheerleader/enabler.

We are told NextGen is ‘transformational’, with implications of great efficiency gains. That’s BULLSHIT! The ONLY benefits are to the aviation operators and FAA personnel, while real people are bearing ever increasing costs.

And a Closing Question

Why are FAA’s controllers and managers complicit in this fraud? Well, more planes in their airspace eventually help air traffic controllers (ATC) to nudge total workloads (and the number of sectors and controllers at that ATC facility) to the next pay level. When controllers see nice pay raises, management gets raises, too. Ultimately, for all of them, retirement pensions rise, too. Paradoxically, per controller productivity (number of flights handled per hour, per controller, for example) continues to decline, and work complexity continues to be reduced by more and more automation. Despite all this, FAA pay and  benefits continue to grow. Go figure.

The SeaTac-POS ILA: Good or Bad?

‘ILA’ sounds like it has potential to be extremely boring, but from what people are saying around Sea-Tac Airport (KSEA), we all need to know what an ‘InterLocal Agreement’ is, and how much harm it can do. Some are saying that the latest ILA draft is yet another bad act by the Port of Seattle: spending taxpayer money to BUY silence from the tiny few elected officials who otherwise could do the most to help mitigate growing airport impact problems.

In this example, a new ILA has been drafted to expedite further growth of the airport and operations. It was drafted by a ‘JAC’ (Joint Advisory Committee), which is a team of five officials, two representing the Port of Seattle (aka POS, operator of KSEA) and three from the city of SeaTac (which essentially surrounds the POS properties). Of course, it is easy to see the push for an ILA comes entirely from POS; we would never see a small community approach an airport authority and ‘ask’ for an ILA. And, when dealing with POS, the relatively inexperienced officials at SeaTac just cave in when monetary treats are offered; money is the drug, and nobody fails to see who is the dealer and who is the addict.

An Analysis by aiReform

A few hours were spent studying the ILA draft, and comments/highlights were added; all of this is viewable in the scrollable PDF below.

One predominant concern is that an ILA appears to be a way for an airport authority to sidestep addressing problems, such as happen related to over-expansion at KSEA. Instead of meeting with impacted area residents and solving problems – finding the right balance between air commerce and local health and quality of life – POS chooses to ‘pay off’ local elected officials, buying their cooperation. Then, if/when local residents go to their elected body for help, well, that’s been cut off by the ILA.

Another general concern is how the city is enabling POS to entirely self-regulate, in exchange for annual cash payments; not too hard for POS to do, since they collect property taxes from residents throughout the Seattle area. Also, with the intended expedited processes, the window for citizen input is essentially shut tight; just not enough time for you or me to read a draft and submit a meaningful concern or suggestion.

In a democratic society, it almost feels like an ILA should be illegal. Federal agencies like FAA should be pressing for rules that protect people against the excesses of ILA’s such as this one. Not surprisingly, FAA remains mute; after all, they serve the airlines first.

People need to take a close look at this, identify what fails, and demand better governance. Airports should serve communities, not airlines.

Click on the image below for a scrollable view; the PDF file may be downloaded.

Another Area Impacted by FAA Indifference: the Beaches of Destin, Florida

Whether they are locals or vacationers, people have a hard time enjoying the beaches of Northwest Florida, when overrun by helicopters. They also wish FAA would serve THE PEOPLE, not just the aviation interests.

Below, Jack Simpson notes that this is probably the most boring column he has yet written, but his annoyance with FAA is crystal clear. This meeting could have been held anywhere, and about so many similar situations involving FAA. The federal agency with all the power to manage U.S. aviation is instead in the business of enabling abuse by aviators, who profit while diminishing local quality of life. Through it all, FAA employees pretend they can do nothing about it. And notice, too, FAA using the same old trick: put the burden on the citizens to comply with onerous requirements, reporting details that often are impossible to compile.

This article was about helicopters, but the same framing could also represent a community impacted by NextGen, skydiving, air tours, etc.

Click on the image below for a scrollable view; the PDF file may be downloaded.

ATC Is Not the Real Cause of Airline Delays…

…and the airlines have long had all the tools they need to solve the problems caused by their own corporate greed and mismanagement. If NextGen impacts are out of control where you live, you need to read the article below.

As a follow-up to yesterday’s Post, here is an outstanding article written by Michael Baiada, a retired United 747 pilot, who sees past the NextGen promotional frauds. Even better, Mr. Baiada gets into the details of how easily the U.S. air travel system could be made more efficient and less impactful, while also improving the flying experience for us consumers. Turns out, the root of the problem today is too many people abdicating their duties: airlines refusing to run their business, regulators who enable this management failure while also serving as cover, lobbyists too focused on perpetuating the lobbying revenue stream, and so forth.

The article is a bit technical but very well written, and Mr. Baiada does an outstanding job explaining system details that FAA/industry work so hard to make muddy and complex. I heartily recommend sitting down and carefully studying this article; you will learn a lot, to help fight for rational airports, serving the local communities ahead of the airlines.

Click on the image below for a scrollable view; the PDF file may be downloaded.

A copy of the article by Michael Boyd, as referenced in Baiada’s article, is archived here.