‘2 + 2 = 5’ … and ‘NextGen is Good for the Environment’


A powerful film about human nature, culture, and the indoctrination process. It warns to NOT question authority. It is in Farsi but with English subtitles.

Of course, this short film is also about much more: religion, ascendant fascism, and the whistleblower-retaliation culture that still predominates today’s aviation world.


See also:
  • (CASE STUDY) – A Whistleblower Retaliation Case: Lewis-FAA
  • (8/24/2015) – FAA’s Culture of Corruption & Cover-Up
  • (9/16/2014) – The John Woods Whistleblower Case
  • (10/17/2013) – The NoPay Game: also used against FAA Whistleblowers
  • (SEP 2012) – Open Letter to Congress: Whistleblowers urge Congress to pass WPEA
  • (4/3/2008) – The 4/3/2008 Congressional Hearing about FAA Whistleblowers
  • (REFERENCE) –  aiREFORM webpage about ‘Whistleblowers’

The John Woods Whistleblower Case

20140909.. John Woods pic from AlJazeera article
At 32-minutes into Broken Dreams: The Boeing 787, the cameras reveal Starkville, Mississippi and then focus in on the story of Whistleblower John Woods. An expert in the manufacturing of composites for aviation, Mr. Woods spoke up for safety at the South Carolina Boeing plant … and he was soon fired. Click on the YouTube display below, and the video will start at the point in the video where Mr. Woods’ story begins.

Mr. Woods was employed in the private sector, but his story is entirely representative of what happens to FAA air traffic controllers, inspectors, and others who similarly speak up for safety. The fact that he is an older employee with many decades of experience is also notable; often, when FAA retaliates against their own employees, they do so to pressure them into early retirements. The pattern is this:

  1. Employee responsibly speaks up about a safety issue.
  2. The Employer is threatened, and retaliates, eventually firing employee.
  3. Employee files a Whistleblower case to higher authorities, such as to FAA’s Office of Audit & Evaluation (Clay Foushee, manager).
  4. After a lengthy delay, the higher authority concludes nothing can be substantiated and drops the case.

In the end, and often after years of delay, all the Whistleblower case processing gives the Agency or company exactly what they want and need: a cleansing of those ‘problem employees’ who have the audacity to speak up for safety. And the dismissed employees? They are each left trying to pick up the pieces of their shattered life.

New Investigative Report on the Boeing 787 Dreamliner and the Li-ion Battery Fires

20130117.. Burnt Li-ion Battery B787

An NTSB picture of a charred Li-ion battery, January 2013.

In early 2013, FAA was forced to ground the entire U.S. Boeing 787 Dreamliner fleet, after two serious incidents in which Li-ion batteries had caught fire. Many aviation safety professionals were very impressed with the transparency and safety advocacy subsequently shown by NTSB and NTSB Chairwoman Deborah Hersman. At the same time, much of FAA’s response smacked of being a loyal waterboy for damage control efforts by Boeing and other corporations in the aviation world.

20140910.. Li-ion Battery becomes a torch

The battery design is extremely volatile. When shot during testing, it quickly became a veritable blow-torch.

FAA’s grounding of the Dreamliner went on for more than three months, and ended on 4/27/2013. In the months since, a few minor incidents have made the news, but more notably there has been a concerted effort by Boeing marketers (with assistance from FAA) to both re-shine the Dreamliner’s image AND micromanage the coverage of all incidents. Eventually, Ms. Hersman resigned her NTSB post and moved on, and Boeing stock has made more than a complete recovery. So, we wait and we hope.

If we are lucky, and if the re-configured marketing efforts were not just hype, we will not see a repeat battery fire or other problem. We will not dread the news when a  Dreamliner filled with passengers has a major failure, out over an ocean and two hours from land.

We hope.

A detailed 48-minute investigative report has been posted on YouTube. Will Jordan and an Al Jazeera team of reporters spent more than a year investigating. They talked with Whistleblowers, management, outsource ‘partners’, union officials, workers, and former DoT Inspector General Mary Schiavo, but they did not talk to any FAA officials. Clay Foushee (AAE-1), as head of the office that is supposed to protect aviation Whistleblowers, would have been an extremely appropriate interview … and his name appears on a memo at around 37-minutes. But, no FAA interviews or, if they did, perhaps the answers were empty and got edited out?

Here are a few quotes and time-marks from this excellent analysis of an FAA/Boeing work culture that appears to have drifted sharply, from safety to earnings reports.

4:50 “We have a contract with Boeing, so we can’t tell any comments to you.”
7:25 “After my building burned down, after that they realized, very emphatically, the danger of this chemistry.”
9:40 “When it comes to building airplanes, the FAA delegates oversight almost completely to the aircraft manufacturers .”
10:35 “I don’t think it’s a sufficient fix. Even inside that steel box, with all of its fortification, all the elements are still there for fire.”
13:50 “…it was almost as if, at times you thought Boeing executives believed, well maybe they could sit in Chicago and have other companies do things, and they would just rake in the money somehow by putting it all together and putting a Boeing sticker on it at the end.”
16:46 “More than any other single event, it was the big lie, and it was a statement that the Boeing Company is now all about the big lie.”
21:10 “They changed basic engineering principles to meet schedule. We all protested.”
24:15 “It’s been eating me alive to know what I know, and to have no avenue, no venue to say anything.”
32:00 The John Woods Whistleblower story (5-minutes)
35:20 “…He turned to the FAA, filing a Whistleblower complaint. The document alleged seven serious violations in the South Carolina plant.” Former DoT-IG Schiavo: “I’ve gotten to the page where they reach their conclusions and the discussion and what they found was that all the allegations, all but one of them they could not substantiate, and the one that they could substantiate, they asked Boeing to fix it, Boeing said ‘OK, we fixed it’, and then they close the investigation. And that’s pretty much how they all go, I mean I’ve seen this so many times.”
37:00 “…It shouldn’t be this hard to do the right thing.”
38:30 “One day you’re regulating the airline, and the next day you’re working for it. You can’t possibly be tough on the industry that you’re regulating, because you’ll never get that plum job after you leave. The regulators at the FAA will rarely cross Boeing.. They simply won’t.”
42:30 Interview with a Boeing VP (and GM of the 787 Program) (2-minutes in, the interview was stopped by Boeing’s Communications Director, and he asked that the cameras be turned off)

Here are links to the aiReform.com Posts related to this issue:

see also:

 

New aiREFORM page about Office of Special Counsel

The Office of Special Counsel (OSC) was formed in 1978, with passage of the Civil Service Reform Act. OSC has been disappointing federal Whistleblowers ever since, at FAA and at other agencies.

Many good FAA employees have spoken up about safety, fraud, waste and other failures, and some of them have felt the need to turn to OSC for help. There have been some success stories, but these are few and far between. In fact, most FAA Whistleblowers who have asked for OSC’s help have only seen their energy diverted and their morale further destroyed. And, many have lost their jobs while OSC fumbles around for lack of funds to do what Congress intended OSC to do.

True reform at FAA will require effective handling of Whistleblower contributions. This is not happening within today’s FAA (Clay Foushee’s Audit & Evaluation office appears to be just window dressing), so any reform will require a more effective OSC.

A new aiREFORM page has been produced. It provides FAQ’s and links, on the following topics:

  • What is the history and purpose of OSC?
  • Who are the key people within OSC?
  • What is a disclosure, and how do I file it?
  • Can the Public see the record on Disclosures?
  • What is OSC’s process for FAA WB disclosures?
  • How might OSC improve their transparency & performance?
OSC: FAQ’s & links …a link to the page at aiREFORM…

 

A letter to Tony Ferrante (AOV-1)

A PDF of the following letter was attached to a recent email, sent to Mr. Ferrante, who has been one of FAA’s top safety officials for well over a decade. The text here includes gold endnotes and green-box links to webpages…

January 21, 2013

Dear Mr. Ferrante:

I would appreciate your professional assistance to ensure appropriate FAA action to resolve a safety failure at the FAA tower in Camarillo, CA (KCMA).[1] This concerns a documented ATC operational error (OE) that occurred on 7/25/10.Œ This error had three ATC witnesses, including a supervisor (FLM) who failed to act with the required report. Perhaps the larger problem is that this safety failure has gone unresolved due to an ongoing series of deficient investigative activities by FAA management, at both the District and Service Area levels.[2] This matter was even shared with Mr. Foushee,Ž but I suspect he just reflexively passed it off (which clearly was not the best move, considering the purpose of Audit & Evaluation).

It is likely that you first became aware of this 7/25/10 KCMA OE via an 8/2/11 memo from Dianne Bebble, your subordinate at AOV-100. The subject of Ms. Bebble’s memo was ‘Report of Investigation: FAA Employee Complaint, Camarillo ATCT’. The memo’s five pages included a chronology of the OE and subsequent ‘investigations’; notes of the four interviews; a partial transcript from the ATC recordings;[3] and a list of facts gleaned from an ATC tape and interviews of the KCMA personnel. The production of this 5-page memo required a visit by ATSI Mark McClure, who flew down from AOV-210 in Renton, WA, to perform the investigation. Mr. McClure heard the tapes,[4] which were thoroughly consistent with the detailed account of a same-runway error, as provided by Ground Controller Mike Marcotte.[5] Oddly, the two other witnesses (both of whom had a vested interest to deny any safety incident) had no memory; i.e., both the Local Controller (Mr. One’ Nielsen, who has since been promoted to be a supervisor) and the FLM in the tower (Mr. Pruitt, who has since promoted to a busier tower) had no information to contribute to Mr. McClure’s investigation. Based on these interviews, Mr. McClure declared the investigation was ‘inconclusive’.

Please note, an ATSAP report WAS FILED by the Local Controller (Mr. Nielsen), but the facts within this critical record were not used (as they clearly should have been) to refresh the memories of Mr. Nielsen and Mr. Pruitt, and thus enable the conclusive analysis that ATSI McClure failed to produce (on his first try).

I trust that you agree, this is not acceptable performance by FAA. I also assume that you were not aware of many of these details when they were reported (or not?) to you in August 2011. Frankly, in an organization as large as FAA, it is quite conceivable that information often gets filtered and/or concealed and/or misdirected. Thankfully, consistent with our Safety Culture, we can easily and quickly remedy these failures.

Some online research shows that you are aware of the Peter Nesbitt whistleblower retaliation case. Mr. Nesbitt responsibly spoke up about serious safety failures at Memphis, TN (KMEM), including events where commercial pilots going around during intersecting runway operations had reported passing under other commercial flights with as little as 100’ vertical separation. You sent a 4/2/07 memo to Bruce Johnson‘ identifying this unsafe ATO noncompliance. Part of your memo stated: “…this ongoing lack of compliance with FAA regulations, despite the advice from ATO’s Safety Services, is unacceptable and requires your immediate attention to ensure compliance with the safety standards in FAA Order 7110.65.”

For the record, the issues at KMEM centered on unsafe operations’ on intersecting runways which management was failing to report, while the unreported 7/25/10 OE at KCMA centered on unsafe operations on the same runway. There is not a lot of difference between these two air traffic safety failures. Both represent clear noncompliances with safety standards. Both represent events that, had just one more link in the chain been broken, they would have produced real fatalities when FAA employees failed.

You are likely also aware that NTSB has included Improve General Aviation Safety“ on their top-ten most-wanted list. This is largely due to the much higher accident/fatality rate for GA vs. commercial aviation. Indeed, thus far in 2013, we have already seen fifteen fatal GA accidents” with at least 30 fatalities. At this rate, and consistent with past FAA safety oversight (which many believe is failing its potential to serve), we can expect roughly 500 aviation fatalities by the end of this calendar year. This is not acceptable.

When our organization fails to identify controller errors, and thus fails to adopt better and safer practices, we not only put pilots at risk; we also diminish public confidence AND we demoralize our best senior controllers, while destroying the potential of our new controllers.

Mr. Ferrante, I suggest our FAA needs to be more assertive in preventing GA accidents. A good place to start would be to ensure that all GA operational errors, such as the concealed KCMA OE of 7/25/10, are fully investigated. Give those two supervisors amnesty if you must, but get them to tell the whole truth. It seems reasonable to expect that, if we promptly conducted an assertive investigation and subsequent report of findings to hundreds of FAA and contract towers, it would reinforce the importance of maintaining same-runway separation. It would also reinforce the importance of timely and open communications related to systemic safety failures. And, it might just prevent a real accident.

So, would you please ensure this is done without any further delay? It would be so easy to resolve the ‘inconclusive’ status of the KCMA investigation by simply having one accountable official (such as you) actually read the ATSAP report and report its content.

Thank you for your service, and please let me know if there is anything I can do to assist.

Jeff Lewis
Former FAA ATCS/whistleblower

 


[1] It is my understanding that you are the Director of the Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service, AOV-1; further, that you report to Peggy Gilligan, who is the Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety (AVS). Please advise if any of this is incorrect and/or if there is another, more appropriate FAA official for this letter. I also understand you are a key FAA official behind the ATSAP MOU signed with NATCA.

[2] It is notable that there was no Local investigation. Two investigations were done belatedly at the District Level. First, in late September 2010, when Rolan Morel reviewed the tapes prior to their release under FOIA, and concluded there was no OE (though he never interviewed anyone, and his transcript erroneously added the word ‘turning’ to the taxiing arrival – you need to listen to the audio). And, second, in March 2011, when Jeff Cunnyngham did a phone interview of the Local Controller. A Western Service Area investigation was conducted in mid-June 2011; AOV-210’s Mark McClure flew down from Renton, WA, and conducted all three needed interviews for the ROI – a full eleven months after the safety failure had occurred.

[3] The key transmission was the ‘cancel takeoff clearance’‘ issued by Local Controller One’ Nielsen, when he recognized the arrival Cessna was still on the runway and being overtaken by the Cub departure on takeoff roll behind the Cessna. This clearly violates 7110.65 para. 3-9-6a and para. 3-9-6b.

[4] It is a measure of the lack of ATO cooperation that Mr. McClure had to obtain these tapes from the whistleblower, as they were not provided by local ATO management.

[5] Be sure to look at the details Mr. Marcotte provided at pgs.4-5. Thus far, the word of a credible and experienced controller has been completely ignored.