JFK: Evidence of FAA & PANYNJ Failure to Manage Capacity & Delays

The two screencaps below look at the ten most congested airports in 2000, as well as the airports for which the most money was spent expanding infrastructure between 1988 and 2002. They are screencaps from slides #17 and #19 of A Historical and Legislative Perspective on Airport Planning & Management, a January 2002 presentation by Alexander T. Wells & Seth B. Young.

In a normal economic environment, actions are taken to mitigate problems. Delays are one such problem. If the aviation sector behaved rationally, regulators (in this case, FAA) and operators (both airports and airlines) would make adjustments to reduce delays, even more so because the delays at the largest hub airports cascade into more delays at other airports.

The data in this January 2002 presentation shows that FAA and airport authorities are not acting rationally to reduce delays and are, in fact, doing exactly the opposite of what they need to do. That is, instead of scaling back excessive operations at the most congested airports, they are doubling down, spending even more money to enable even more over-scheduling (and congestion/delays) by the major airlines.

A look at the major airports serving the NYC-Philadelphia area is revealing. The four main airports all rank in the top-10 delay airports for 2000:

  • Newark (EWR, United hub): ranked #1
  • LaGuardia (LGA): ranked #2
  • Kennedy (JFK, major hub for American/Delta/JetBlue): ranked #5
  • Philadelphia (PHL, American hub being scaled down): ranked #7

The worst-case example is JFK. The role of this airport has always including serving as a major international hub, but, with the formation of JetBlue, a substantial amount of domestic hub traffic has been added. The airlines make higher profits when they increase hub through-traffic, but airline pursuit of higher profits is supposed to be balanced against impacts such as more noise pollution, more air pollution, and more surface road congestion. The airport authority (PANYNJ) and federal regulator (FAA) are supposed to ensure this balance, but they fail; unfortunately, both FAA and PANYNJ are instead focused solely on serving airline profits, and are thus blinded from seeing the impacts, such as under the JFK Arc of Doom.

How bad is the failure by FAA/PANYNJ regarding JFK? Well, notice the last column in the table below.Of the top-ten delay hubs in 2000, only two have seen positive average annual growth in operations, from 2000 to 2017. By far, the largest average growth is at JFK, averaging 1.5% annual growth in operations. Compare that with Philadelphia, which has averaged a 1.3% annual decline in operations. Is the Philadelphia population shrinking while the NYC-area population is exploding, to explain these two trends? No. These trends – and the subsequent impacts – are due to airline scheduling, motivated by airline profits. Philadelphia is scaling down because American absorbed US Airways, and since then, American has been shifting schedule capacity AWAY from PHL and TOWARD JFK, LGA, and DCA (yet another high-impact airport).

Clearly, if FAA wanted to take a decisive action in 2018, to reduce delays, that action would focus on managing capacity, such as by imposing flow rate reductions at JFK, EWR, and LGA. It would also focus on encouraging airlines to shift capacity back to PHL, DTW, PIT, CVG, CLE and other airports that are operating far below what they were designed to serve.

Ponder this fact, too: how is it that when we look at a top-ten list of delay airports from 18-years ago, we see that 80% of those airports have since scaled down while most populations have grown? How is it we are told by FAA and industry that airports and aviation are economic gold-mines, and yet this alleged booming industry is declining nearly everywhere? How much of the FAA/industry sales pitch is hot air and propaganda? Is there anything we are told by these players that reflects reality and nurtures an informed public process, serving everyone and not just corporate interests?

Hubbing Strategies Increase Impacts, But Do Not Create Sustainable Airline Profits

Airline stocks have been tanking lately, in no small part due to strategy shifts by United. In a nutshell, United is trying to design a broad restructuring of its three domestic-focused hubs in Chicago, Denver and Houston. Why? Because this trio of domestic hubs “…has profit margins that are 10 percent below the inland domestic hubs operated by American Airlines Group Inc. and Delta Air Lines Inc….”

The situation is discussed in this Bloomberg article (click here to view source, or view the archived PDF copy below).

Click on the image below for a scrollable view; the PDF file may be downloaded.

What is the most consequential quote in the article?

“As part of its strategy, United is boosting connections in its three mid-continent hubs by an average of 17 percent by adjusting its flight schedules, a process it’s completed in Houston and will commence in Chicago next month.”

In this one quote, United is making it clear that, for all major U.S. hubs, traffic growth is NOT about customer demand; it is airline schedule tweaking, to increase profits, that is causing the huge impact increases at major hubs, especially at KBOS, KJFK, KDCA, and KSEA.

Which airports/hubs are most monopolized?

Here are the main hubs for the four largest airlines:

  • American: Charlotte [KCLT], Dallas-Ft Worth [KDFW], Miami [KMIA], and Philadelphia [KPHL]
  • Delta: Atlanta [KATL], Minneapolis St Paul [KMSP], and Salt Lake City [KSLC]
  • United: Cleveland [KCLE], Washington-Dulles [KIAD], and Houston [KIAH]
  • Southwest: Baltimore [KBWI], Dallas-Love [KDAL], and Chicago-Midway [KMDW]

Most other major airports are either smaller market and dominated by Southwest, or they are duopoly hubs. Four duopoly hubs that stand out are:

  1. Denver [KDEN] – Southwest and United
  2. Chicago O’Hare [KORD] – American and United
  3. Phoenix [KPHX] – American and Southwest
  4. Sea-Tac [KSEA] – Alaska and Delta

Will hub concentration reduce over time?

No, not likely at all. The level of industry scheduling collusion, and the absence of real regulatory oversight, ensure this trend toward hub concentration will continue to intensify. As an example, look at the hub concentrations for 2013 data, at this aiReform Post. Note that nothing has changed: at the bulk of these 77 airports, monopolies and duopolies have only strengthened in the past four years.

Who is to Blame – and Who Can Fix – the Impacts Around U.S. Hub Airports?

A recent news article out of Phoenix [KPHX] shows that both FAA and local officials are again ‘collaborating’ to screw over residents impacted by NextGen routes. Click here to view an archived copy with aiReform comments.

What I find most distressing about this article is it shows the real intent of the so-called settlement between FAA and local officials. FAA plainly lost when their case was finally heard at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit (USCADC). A responsible federal agency, actually serving the public (instead of just industry), would have accepted the court decision and promptly acted to correct their errors. Instead, FAA lawyers pressed local officials to compromise, to effectively defang the court decision … thus rendering the court meaningless. They crafted a deal that only perpetuates and expands the root problem: real people impacted by aviation have been shut out from having any voice, any local control, to protect their homes and communities.

An Analysis

When neighborhoods (and health) are being ruined by excessive airport scheduling, who is to blame? And, who can fix the problems?

With or without legal action,[1] there is always a small collection of ‘parties’ involved, including:

  • Elected officials (local, and federal)
  • FAA – the federal ‘regulator’ created to serve the public, funded by the public, but inordinately serving industry
  • Local/state administrative officials
  • Airlines (and other industry players)
  • Real people: impacted neighbors/residents, as well as locals who use aviation services

What role does each party play, and how are these parties interconnected? At the federal level, our elected officials have been lobbied by industry to create laws – including fee/tax systems – that shift the balance of power amongst parties. FAA, a captured regulator serving industry, then processes these laws into regulations, always with a bias that benefits the airlines. At the heart of these laws and regulations, Congress and FAA are stealing away local control. The effect is that the airlines, along with FAA, have evolved into a sovereign alien, occupying not just the sprawling airport lands but also the air above our homes. Real people – in homes, in city halls, and even in the governor’s mansion – have no meaningful powers to mitigate these absentee landlords who are indifferent about how their decisions trend their status toward ‘slumlord’.

That’s the core of it: No local control. Congress and FAA have created administrative sovereignty for an invasive and metastasizing aviation industry.

The situation is worsened today by the extent to which human greed is being played. Even our best officials are compromised by the lobbyists who now run the show.

Increasingly, it is an extremely rare official who, after winning an election or spending decades climbing to a high level administrative position, still maintains an ability to serve people, and not money. Corporations know what they want, and lobbyists (many of whom are also earning FAA retirement pensions!) know how to spin and maneuver to achieve what the corporations want. Money makes a great hearing aid; officials who seem tone deaf to constituent concerns ALWAYS come through to serve money. Some officials go totally rogue, accepting payouts, kickbacks, and jobs for the spouse. Most bought officials are careful to remain subtle. In all cases, though, nearly all officials find it easiest to bend to the lobbyist pressures; they drink their koolaid and trust their hype, without any critical assessment. Thinking and leadership are hard work; bending is far more convenient, especially if there is personal financial gain attached. In effect, and in time, many local/state officials become captured as industry servants.

Let’s be very clear on one other thing. When a new commercial airline impact appears and/or grows, it always does so because the one or two airlines who dominate that airport are tweaking the daily flight schedule, in pursuit of profits. Those profits do NOT come from adding more air travel for local residents; no, the profits come from more intense use of the local airport as a hub for more flights. The airline tallies more ‘through-passengers’ who pass through the airport as a passenger-sorting facility; the airport authority scores more PFC taxes, to pay off more accumulated airport capital improvement debt and fund more future airport growth projects. The airport sprawls larger and noise and pollutant impacts increase, yet the aviation service benefits to local residents show no meaningful gain.

Since the airlines are profit-seeking corporations, they do everything they can to minimize the costs (including labor) when implementing these changes. Thus, the fewest possible jobs are created; in other words, while noise/health impacts may soar, the real local economic benefits are held to a minimum. The marginal costs of growing a hub schedule typically always far exceed the marginal benefits to the local economy … which is why we see so much FAA/industry collaborated propaganda, spinning the illusion of airports as massive economic engines (while conveniently ignoring the massive subsidies involved).

A Short Data Example, from San Diego:

Here’s a table with enplanement data, extracted from the 2008 airport master plan for the crowded on-runway airport in San Diego [KSAN]. Operations data has been added, from FAA’s ATADS database. Also, the year-to-year change has been calculated.

  enplanements Yr-to-Yr change Operations (ATADS) Yr-to-Yr change
2002 7,471,644 206,605
2003 7,637,193 2.2% 204,713 -0.9%
2004 8,200,687 7.4% 215,211 5.1%
2005 8,692,694 6.0% 229,192 6.5%
2006 8,759,669 0.8% 230,798 0.7%
2007 9,172,966 4.7% 237,574 2.9%

Did local demand for aviation services grow 7.4% during 2004 and another 6.0% during 2005? No. If the local population had grown at such rates than, yes, it would be reasonable to expect such large annual increases. But, in fact, the enplanements grew far in excess of population growth. So, the enplanements grew due to shifts in airline scheduling. Those shifts massively increased the number of people from elsewhere, who became counted as enplanements when they changed planes or occupied a through-seat.

San Diego is a good example to study this because it is remotely located, in a corner of the nation, and close enough to the major hub at LAX. As such, it does not have the geographically central location needed to function well as an energy-efficient hub for through-passengers, at least not for domestic trips. In fact, if you study the airport’s Competition Plan,[2] you will see that all three legacy airlines (American, Delta, and United) offer very limited flights, primarily feeding only to their major U.S. hubs. The two airlines that use KSAN for hubbing are Southwest and Alaska. Southwest is the dominant airline and feeds many passengers through KSAN with origins or destinations along the West Coast. Alaska does the same thing, but Alaska’s hubbing is mostly to serve passengers vacationing at numerous Mexican destinations. If FAA wanted to minimize impacts on the local community at this very congested airport, they would remove the current incentives to use KSAN as a through-hub. If congressional officials wanted to help, they too would remove the current incentives, by pushing for changes in the laws that have defined the current problematic fee and tax system. If local officials wanted to serve impacted local residents, they would at least advocate, demanding FAA and Congress take these actions.

Some might suggest these growth figures do not reflect airline scheduling strategies, but instead reflect a recovery from 9/11. This is not the case. It is absolutely true that, across the U.S., enplanements and operations dropped after 9/11. But, two other truths also exist: (1) at all but the biggest hub airports, airline activity growth rates were already starting to decline in 2000;[3] and (2) the bulk of the recovery was completed in 2003. In other words, if FAA applied its resources to objectively study the data and report it to the public, FAA itself would prove that, by the end of 2003, the real people residing in and near San Diego had fully resumed their local consumption of aviation services. An uncaptured federal regulator writing such a report would confirm: the growth in impacts upon the local community are solely due to FAA’s accommodation of airline scheduling; more through-passengers means more profits … and more impacts.

What does this analysis mean, for resolving aviation impacts?

It all comes down to airline schedule changes for which marginal impacts increase far more than marginal benefits.[4] The impacts are increasing because the Av-Gov Complex is a machine that has airlines, FAA, and various local/state officials ‘collaborating’ to feed benefits to corporations … and this very same machine is screwing over the people. There is no local control. Instead, we have predictable choreography, with Av-Gov Complex players finger-pointing and claiming they are powerless, with zero accountability as impacts continue to worsen.

People want aviation services, but they also want (and need!) local control.

Since 2012, when Delta announced a new hub expansion at Sea-Tac [KSEA], all airport metrics have grown enormously (annual operations, enplanements, fuel consumption, air cargo tonnage). But so too have grown the many problems that both FAA and Port of Seattle take no action to fix: noise impacts, air pollutant impacts, arrival congestion forcing delays even at cruise altitude, road congestion for Seattle-area access to the airport terminal, even lengthy tarmac delays simply because the airlines are allowed to schedule in excess of existing gate capacity. The ongoing non-performance by FAA and Port of Seattle, and their bias toward accommodating airline greed, is shameful.

If O’Hare [KORD] scaled back to half its operations, would the Chicago area still be amply served with excellent service across the globe? Absolutely. And, at the same time, would impacts upon neighborhoods to the east and west be reduced? Yes, and to an astonishingly positive degree (as would national system delays).

Is the same true at other major hub airports? Yes. All of the communities where summer barbeques are destroyed (the food just doesn’t smell right, when the air smells like jet fuel), where incessant and repetitive noise patterns deny the restorative powers of nature or enjoying backyard play, where sleep is lost to accommodate loud early-morning cargo flights … all of these communities want their local airport to provide local services. But, these residents also want (and need!) local control, so that the scale of airport development and airline scheduling does not end up destroying health and quality of life.

The problems are not just at Phoenix, San Diego, Seattle and Chicago. While most U.S. airports continue to scale back (this is a shrinking industry), there is a small handful of other airports where one or two airlines want to grow more hubbing profits. To enable this, FAA’s NextGen implementation is plowing down residential quality of ([KBOS], [KJFK], [KLGA], [KBWI], [KDCA], [KCLT], and [KSFO] are all on that list).

Solutions will not happen, so long as the co-conspirators continue to conspire. The problems are local, and the best people to define and resolve the problems are the local residents. We are long overdue for the restoration of REAL LOCAL CONTROL, even (and especially!) at our largest hub airports.

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[1] It is also important to understand: the legal actions, such as the case heard when Phoenix sued FAA, are not full-fledged lawsuits where a plaintiff can force corrections and payment of damages; these are practically administrative hearings, as they are directed (by Congress) to be filed under a very short time limit, to the USCADC, which has a long history of bias favoring corporations, federal agencies, and other status quo powers. If Congress cared to protect citizen rights, we would be granted far more latitude, to pick more favorable court venues.

[2] One of the more interesting details within this Competition Plan is at pages 11-12; it is there noted that KSAN offers direct scheduled passenger flights to 56 destinations, but 47 of those are served by only ONE airline. Routes are thus 84% monopoly-flown.

[3] FAA ATADS data shows that KSAN commercial operations peaked in 1995 (219K), then dropped every year, bottoming out at 191K ops in 2000. In 2001, when airports were totally shut down for days, KSAN commercial ops actually INCREASED to 192K. Fifteen years later, the 2016 commercial ops had retreated 2.9%, to 186K; also, between 2001 and 2016, declines in TOTAL airport ops were even steeper, down 4.8%.

[4] Significantly, too, while the benefits accrue solely to the non-resident airline corporation, the costs accrue to the local residents. This cost-shift is a taking.

Here’s an online search worth trying: ‘Lane McFadden FAA’

Do any quick online search using these three words ‘Lane McFadden FAA’ and you will find quite a few links. Most are to articles and court activities related to petitions for review, filed by communities upset with FAA’s impacts and arrogance.

Mr. McFadden must be accomplished and well trained: he is a lawyer for the Department of Justice. But, the poor lad must have made a bad impression at DoJ, as he has been stuck for years, wheeling and dealing to get cases thrown out, and sometimes arguing before 3-judge panels, before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (USCADC). Or, then again, maybe in the legal world he is a rock star for always having so much work to get paid for. At any rate, he was last seen – just last week – again trying to bail out FAA. He lost the Phoenix ‘petition for review’ last summer, and had to repeat his canister of ‘NextGen is good’ arguments all over again, this time for a similar case filed by residents being impacted by NextGen routes in and out of Washington National Airport.

Why Lane McFadden? Primarily because his name comes up in the article discussed below. But, even more, because I am sure glad I am not a DOJ environmental attorney stuck defending FAA. Too dark for my taste.

Here are archived copies for three cases: Click here for a USCADC decision that Mr. McFadden won for FAA in February 2009; click here for another he won, in June 2009; click here for the Phoenix PFR he lost in August 2017. Study them and you may just learn a LOT about how biased USCADC is, how they nearly always side with agencies and large corporations (first, they do all they can to just dump the PFR, then, if they do hear it, they strain their attention to side in favor of FAA; a real dog-and-pony show).

Now, about that article… here is a worthwhile analysis by Tony Verreos:

“This article says it took 2 years or more to get to the same Federal Appeals Court that ruled on the Phoenix case last year. No surprise the plaintiffs claim the FAA failed to give proper notice, and the FAA counters they went above and beyond the requirements.
Meanwhile – the one statistic that stands out very plainly is the growing number of complaints. It seems like wherever the FAA installs its new changes, complaints go up in multiples of double, triple, quadruple and even higher.
For all of the money wasted, and time people will never get back attending meetings they wish they never went to about jet noise and chemical pollution, the FAA still flat out refuses to change its Mission Statement to “Protecting Public Health and Safety” from Safety and Efficiency which it interprets very strictly as fuel savings while knowing full well how anti public health that is. And their claims of safety look great when you see no crashes. The safety chart does look great, but then they don’t display all the go arounds (wasting fuel and polluting our air), and the near misses which seem to be a growing number!”

Click here to view an archived copy of this Washington Post article.

BTW, Tony’s comment was posted at a new Facebook public group he recently created, STOP Jet Noise NOW! SFOAK North S.F. Bay Area.

See also:
  • 8/29/2017FAA Ordered to Vacate Their 2014 NextGen Routes in Phoenix (aiReform Post)

UPDATE, 1/24/2018: — An opinion piece was published at WaPost, and a copy is archived here. The author is Paul Verchinski, who is a member of the community roundtable for yet another airport where FAA’s NextGen mess is impacting residents: Baltimore-Washington [KBWI].

NextGen is the FAA’s Carte Blanche to Wreak Havoc on the Public’s Ears and Serenity

Here’s an archived copy of an excellent article, written by Barbara Castleton, one of many NextGen victims in the Seattle area. She does an excellent job portraying how FAA and industry do not care at all about the health impacts (and diminished quality of life) caused by NextGen. A few aiREFORM footnotes have been added to this archived copy, to expand on some technical aspects.

Click here to view the source article at Medium.com.

Click on the image below for a scrollable view; the PDF file may be downloaded.

Did This Letter Motivate Huerta’s Response to Governor Hogan?

Activists in Maryland shared a copy of this letter, another excellent effort by their Governor, Larry Hogan.

(click on image to view archived copy of full letter)

Essentially, the Governor sent a letter on May 11, pressing FAA to take actions to reduce impacts on constituents under flight paths for both Reagan National [KDCA] and Baltimore-Washington [KBWI]. Nearly three months after sending his letter to Michael Huerta, and having gotten no reply, Governor Hogan followed up with a letter to the Secretary of Transportation, Elaine Chao. Here’s an excerpt:FAA’s reply letter, dated 8/3/2017, is here. That is, if you can even call it a reply.

FAA has a shameful record of not just blowing off everyone – even Governors! – but also engaging in obfuscation to frustrate activists. This pattern of failure needs to end.

President Trump: You Need to Fire Michael Huerta

Whatever happened to draining the swamp? Is there any agency more dysfunctional, more corrupt and more locked into serving industry cronies than the FAA, the faux-regulator headed by Administrator Huerta?

Here’s the latest example of how out of control this agency has become, and how badly Mr. Huerta fails at leading long overdue change. Back in early May, the Governor of Maryland wrote an excellent letter (view a copy here), pressing FAA to bring relief to thousands losing sleep and health under NextGen routes. It took nearly three months for Mr. Huerta to finally send a response letter. The long delay was not necessary to do any difficult analysis or produce any changes. No, nothing was analyzed, and nothing was changed; the long delay was just to waste time. In fact, Huerta’s letter was chock full of platitudes and unsupported sales pitches. Here’s a PDF copy of the entire letter, showing portions with footnoted analysis added by aiREFORM:

Click on the image below for a scrollable view; the PDF file may be downloaded.

Enough is enough. Huerta’s belated reply letter is garbage: a classic example of what we would expect from an agency head who views the airlines as his ‘customers’, not the regulatory subject for the rigorous regulations FAA fails to write and fails to apply. Through the botched NextGen implementation, Mr. Huerta’s agency has also become a case study in ‘runaway captured regulators’. FAA is a perfect target for sweeping reforms. If President Trump wants to do good while throwing fire and fury, he should direct his energies domestically. Cleaning up FAA can set the example for how all federal agencies need to be trimmed back to a focused mission and restrained from federal over-reach, while becoming massively transparent and accountable.

It’s an easy call: fire Michael Huerta, and make FAA serve the people, first.

A Work-Around to FAA’s Failed Noise Models

This Post looks at how a simple and economical noise study for a large park and natural area suggests a better way to study airport noise. It essentially presents a work-around to two root problems in how FAA and industry ‘collaborate’ to obstruct aviation noise activism:

  1. that FAA knowingly uses noise metrics and noise models that work great for the airlines – since they completely fail to define and mitigate aviation noise impacts, but work terribly for people – since they consistently fail to objectively quantify noise and impacts; and,
  2. that, whenever citizens approach FAA or airport authorities with their concerns, and seek hard data to help define and fix the problems, both FAA and airport authorities routinely withhold that data, and instead work to confuse and disillusion these activists.

The Boston (Logan) Noise Impacts

In recent years, FAA has become extremely accommodating to hub airlines, by no longer pushing back against excessive flight scheduling. At Boston Logan [KBOS], the airport configuration allowing the highest capacity in terms of ‘runway throughput’ or operations per hour, includes using the parallel runways 4L and 4R for arrivals. KBOS has major hub operations by JetBlue, and minor hub operations by American and Delta. So, with FAA intensifying the use of runways 4L and 4R for arrivals, even in crosswind and slight tailwind conditions, they are imposing an enormous noise and air pollutant burden on communities under the straight-in arrival corridor.

The impact upon communities below, such as Milton, has been intense. People are losing sleep (the short term impact) and breathing more aviation pollutants (which will cause serious long-term health impacts). They are complaining to both FAA and the airport authority, Massport, as well as to their elected reps and local community officials. Their complaints continue to be broadly ignored by the key authorities – FAA and Massport – both of whom routinely reply that ‘nothing has changed’ and ‘the perceived impacts are not significant by our standards’. Needless to say, this mishandling by FAA and Massport only infuriates and further sensitizes the impacted communities.

Something has to change. FAA/Massport must stop pretending to comply with federal and state environmental impact assessment processes, which they do by using worthless impact models. Frankly, these models were designed to create an illusion that impacts are objectively measured, and they were also designed to bias the conclusions to ensure validation of any and all airport operational expansions. We need a new model that is objective; a model with people collecting REAL noise data and compiling it into impact contours may be the best way to go.

Noise Modeling at Blue Hills Reservation

The Blue Hills Reservation includes 125-miles of trails on 7,000 acres. A prominent water body in this natural area is Houghton’s Pond, which happens to be under the straight-in approach to runways 4L and 4R, at approximately 11-miles from the landing threshold.

Friends of the Blue Hills is a local non-profit organization that coordinates volunteers and works to preserve and protect this wonderful natural resource. A recent Post at their blog announced a great project. It looks like Boston University is doing a noise study; professor Richard Primack and doctoral student Lucy Zipf appear to be crowd-sourcing the use of an iphone app by volunteer hikers, to compile an actual noise map of the trails for most or even all 7,000 acres of Blue Hills Reservation.It will be very interesting to see what they produce. Seemingly, if the app-devices are synchronized, they could create a noise contour map that would show actual noise levels at any one time. Further, a collection of maps could be created, so that noise impacts for varying conditions can be compared.

How This Might Be Used For Aviation Noise Impacts

The app and methodologies could easily be applied to a residential community, such as Milton (or Des Moines, WA; or Cabin John, MD; or Palo Alto, CA; etc.). What’s to stop a local activist group from staging a grid of 4- or 6- or even dozens of devices at mapped street locations in Milton, and compiling the data into maps that show REAL decibel-level impacts? What’s to stop that same group from creating reference maps on days where there are no runway 4R and 4L arrivals, to establish a definitive baseline noise level?

Let’s watch this project and see if it offers a smart and economical work-around, so we can move beyond the ongoing data obstruction by FAA and airport authorities.

Boston noise activist groups:

NextGen: “A Virtual Highway, and the Traffic Never Stops”

A good opinion piece related to NextGen impacts (and ongoing FAA failures) near the Baltimore-Washington Airport [KBWI]. This airport serves as the hub for Southwest, in the DC area (NOTE: the two other major airports serving the DC area are Dulles [KIAD] and Reagan National [KDCA]; United hubs at KIAD, and American dominates at KDCA]. There is some misinformation in the Op/Ed, as happens in a world run by money and set on crafting and pitching propaganda, but they also make some great points.

Here is an archived copy, with aiREFORM footnotes added:

Click on the image below for a scrollable view; the PDF file may be downloaded.

Does JetBlue Care to Minimize Impacts?

Parts of Boston are being severely impacted by NextGen, under routes in and out of Logan [KBOS]. Not just by the narrow route concentration FAA is creating in their environmentally destructive application of satellite technologies, but also in the increased hub concentration that FAA is enabling.

In a nutshell, the airlines want to concentrate flights into just a handful of major hubs, but they need FAA’s help to do this. They need FAA to increase ‘runway throughput’, so that the major hub airlines at airports like Boston can add just a few more flights each hour. Of course, the problem is, in their accomodating the airlines, FAA is causing oversaturation of schedules to the point where:

  1. flows are virtually non-stop for most of the day; and
  2. the slightest bit of weather or surge of flights creates overload, and ATC works the arrivals into long conga lines – harder and less safe for ATC and flight crews, but also greatly amplifying impacts upon residents below.

JetBlue has a major hub presence at Boston. Not only that, but JetBlue is a major player at two other hub airports where flight overscheduling is destroying communities: LaGuardia [KLGA] and Reagan National [KDCA]. And, JetBlue’s network relies heavily on connecting passengers through these three hub airports.

Also, JetBlue uses social media to pitch their product, to try and encourage more people to take more flights, and more frequently. The JetBlue facebook page solicits comments from viewers, so it makes sense that a viewer in Milton, impacted by the increase in noise and air pollution by JetBlue and other airlines, would offer concerns and make constructive suggestions. This is precisely what was done, when Andy Schmidt initiated a discussion by sending JetBlue a message, on May 30th. After nearly a month of back-and-forth, and with many delays, Andy came to the conclusion that, frankly, “JetBlue doesn’t care.” He then posted a series of four screencaps, documenting the ‘discussion’. Here’s a compilation:

Click on the image below for a scrollable view; the PDF file may be downloaded.

When it comes to environmental responsibility around hub airports, there is a huge vacuum. Neither FAA nor the industry they are supposed to regulate are working to protect communities from noise and air pollutant impacts. It is only about money, these days.

In the example above, Andy shows a great way to nudge the airlines toward becoming responsive and accountable. What is particularly intriguing about this example is that Andy pointed the airline right at a very effective and affordable action that would reap tremendous environmental benefits: the vortex generator. Here are two graphs from a320whine.com:

The red curve shows two spikes, at ~560 and ~620 hertz, which are the infamous ‘A320 whine’. Notice the substantial noise reduction (green curve) at these frequencies, when the VG deflectors are added.

The green shaded area shows noise reduction from red line (an A320 without the VGs) to green line (an A320 with the VGs added). Study this graph carefully; it shows an improvement, but notice, too, zero improvement within the final 12-miles (20-kilometers) of the arrival. Given the cost, this improvement is well worth the money spent, but airlines and FAA will also need to better manage traffic loads, such as by reducing hourly flow rates.

CONCLUSION: This is a good example of how social media can be used constructively, to engage airlines, and hopefully, to nudge them toward becoming more compatible with the communities they impact. And, the vortex generators are a real opportunity for JetBlue to show they care.

Will they? Will JetBlue’s management wake up, so thousands can sleep better?