

TESTIMONY OF VINCENT L. COLLAMORE, CONCERNING THE OVERFLY OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE (A.D) 2004-18-06, THAT REQUIRES REPETITIVE INSPECTIONS TO FIND FATIGUE CRACKING OF CERTAIN UPPER AND LOWER FUSELAGE SKIN PANELS TO CERTAIN BOEING MODEL 737-200,-200C,-300,-400, AND -500 SERIES AIRPLANES.

I was notified by Southwest Airlines Regulatory Compliance prior to March 19, 2007, the exact date I am unsure of, that Southwest Airlines had possibly overflowed a repetitive inspection on some of their -300 and -500 aircraft and that they were unsure of the exact number of affected aircraft. They had also informed the Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI) Mr. Doug Gawadzinski of this finding prior to notifying me. On March 19, 2007, Southwest Airlines Regulatory Compliance Manager Mr. Paul Comeau made the Official Self Disclosure that Southwest Airlines had in fact overflowed the required repetitive on stringer 10 left and right between Body Station (BS) 540 to 597 and 663 to 727 on 49 aircraft to Mr. Gawadzinski.

I was never assigned the responsibility to investigate this event. I did provide Mr. Gawadzinski a copy of A.D 2004-18-06 and Boeing Service Bulletin 737-53A1210, Revision 1, dated October 25, 2001. Although I was not assigned to investigate this event I did familiarize myself with the A.D and Service Bulletin. During this review I found no specific requirements to inspect stringer 10 between (BS) 540 to 597 and 663 to 727. I did notice that when A.D. 2004-18-06 was in Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) and was out for comment a request was made "for an inspection method be specified for the internal doubler at the emergency exit surround structure as shown in Figure 5 of the service bulletin, or that the requirement to inspect this area be removed." the inspection requirements of Boeing Service Bulletin 737-53A1210, Revision 1 in the area between BS 540 and BS 727 would require a different inspection procedure than the Boeing 737 NDT Manual Part 6, Subject 53-30-18 or 53-30-19 procedures which are specified in figure 5 of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-53A1210, Revision 1, dated October 25, 2001.

The FAA Aircraft Certification Office (ACO) response was "We agree with the commenter that there should not be a requirement to inspect this area because the internal doubler that extends above stringer 10 stabilizes the skin in this area and eliminates this area as a cracking concern."

Based on this information the decision was made by the PMI to accept the Self disclosure and allow the continued operation of the affected aircraft.

Respectfully Submitted  
Vincent L Collamore  
Aviation Safety Inspector