


AIRPORT DIAGRAM

AL-253 (FAA)

MEMPHIS INTL (MEM)
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE

SE-1, 10 JAN 2013 to 07 FEB 2013

SE-1, 10 JAN 2013 to 07 FEB 2013



AIRPORT DIAGRAM

MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE
MEMPHIS INTL (MEM)

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM

NASA has established an Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) to identify issues in the aviation system which need to be addressed. The program of which this system is a part is described in detail in FAA Advisory Circular 00-46D and FAA Handbook 7210.3. Your assistance in informing us about such issues is essential to the success of the program. Please fill out this form as completely as possible, enclose in an sealed envelope, affix proper postage, and send it directly to us.

Section 91.25 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 91.25) prohibits reports filed with NASA from being used for FAA enforcement purposes. This report will not be made available to the FAA for civil penalty or certificate actions for violations of the Federal Air Regulations. Your identity strip, stamped by NASA, is proof that you have submitted a report to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. We can only return the strip to you, however, if you have provided a mailing address. Equally important, we can often obtain additional useful information if our safety analysts can talk with you directly by telephone. For this reason, we have requested telephone numbers where we may reach you.

The information you provide on the identity strip will be used only if NASA determines that it is necessary to contact you for further information. THIS IDENTITY STRIP WILL BE RETURNED DIRECTLY TO YOU. The return of the identity strip assures your anonymity.

Thank you for your contribution to aviation safety.

NOTE: AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS SHOULD NOT BE REPORTED ON THIS FORM. SUCH EVENTS SHOULD BE FILED WITH THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD AS REQUIRED BY NTSB Regulation 830.5 (49CFR830.5).

If you want to mail this form, please fold both pages (and additional pages if required), enclose in a sealed, stamped envelope, and mail to:



NASA AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM
POST OFFICE BOX 189
MOFFETT FIELD, CALIFORNIA 94035-0189

If you wish to submit online, click the **Submit** button at the bottom of page 2 or 3 when complete.

DESCRIBE EVENT/SITUATION

Keeping in mind the topics shown below, discuss those which you feel are relevant and anything else you think is important. Include what you believe really caused the problem, and what can be done to prevent a recurrence, or correct the situation. (USE ADDITIONAL PAPER IF NEEDED)

While working Ground Control 1 (GC1) today I observed a loss of separation on Final that went unreported. This loss of separation was caused by the Supervisor allowing a situation to develop, and essentially saying that the Tower was providing visual separation, when the weather conditions prevented either aircraft from being in sight.

A twin-engine aircraft was on final for RWY 18R with a Turbojet staggered behind the twin for RWY 18L. Based on the runway distance criteria, we the Final Controller must maintain a 2.0 NM stagger all the way down the final approach until 1 mile from the runway, or until the Local Controller can provide Visual Separation. The turbojet was gaining on the twin when the Local Control 1 (LC1) Controller indicated that someone needed to break-out one of the two aircraft where separation was being lost. Neither aircraft was talking to the Tower at the time this remark was made. The two aircraft check in with LC1 and LC2, and the 2.0 NM stagger was subsequently lost. The LC2 Controller indicated that he was going to break the turbojet out and send that aircraft around, but the Supervisor said "I've got the twin in sight." Someone in the Tower told the Supervisor that he had to have both aircraft in sight in order to provide visual separation. The Supervisor then stated, "I have them both in sight."

No one in the Tower Cab could see either aircraft until each was on short final for their respective runways. Management insists that we run a "safe" operation, adhering to the rules and regulations at all times. They will violate us in heartbeat for any minor indiscretion when it suits their agenda, but we have situations like this were management will allow a loss of separation to take place at their whim and discretion.

MEM, OCT-2006

CHAIN OF EVENTS

- How the problem arose
- How it was discovered
- Contributing factors
- Corrective actions

HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS

- Perceptions, judgments, decisions
- Actions or inactions
- Factors affecting the quality of human performance

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 MOFFETT FIELD, CALIFORNIA 94035-0189

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While working Ground Control 2 (GC2) during the beginning of an arrival push at MEM, I observed a loss of separation that went unreported when brought to the attention of the Tower Supervisor. Approach was running "Staggered Approaches" to RWY 36L and 36R. Final West (ARF) and Final East (ARM) were both open. N884CC, a PA32 was on the ILS RWY 36R. AAL282, an MD80 was on approach to RWY 36L. The MD80 was gaining on the PA32, and the required 2 mile stagger spacing was going to be lost. The Local Control 2 (LC2) Controller told the Supervisor that he was going to break-out the PA32, but the Supervisor directed the LC2 Controller to "let it ride". Separation was lost, and no one did anything about it. Our facility is involved in a "competition" with several other facilities that have had an "excessive" number of operational errors. It is my impression that MEM Management does not want to report any errors so that we may win the award and allow the Facility Manager to look good for his superiors. Several other Controllers have reported Operational Errors, but after investigation, it was found that no error occurred.

MEM, OCT-2006

CHAIN OF EVENTS

- How the problem arose
- Contributing factors
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HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS

- Perceptions, judgments, decisions
- Factors affecting the quality of human performance
- Actions or inactions

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM

NASA has established an Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) to identify issues in the aviation system which need to be addressed. The program of ASRS in this system is described in FAA Order 8000.1, and in the FAA Handbook 12-23. Your assistance in informing us about such issues is essential to the success of the program. Please fill out this form as completely as possible, enclose in an sealed envelope with proper postage, and send it directly to us.

The information you provide on the identity strip will be used only if NASA determines that it is necessary to contact you for further information. THIS IDENTITY STRIP WILL BE RETURNED DIRECTLY TO YOU. The return of the identity strip assures your anonymity.

Section 87(2)(b) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (49 CFR 87.23) and the reports filed on the ASRS form being used for FAA's government purposes. This report will not be made available to the FAA, the National Center of Aviation System for Aviation of the Federal Aviation Regulators. Your identity strip stamped by NASA is proof that you are a reported a report to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. We can only return the strip to you, however, if you have provided a mailing address. If you report it to us then please provide additional information for safety analysis can get with you directly by telephone. For this reason, we have requested telephone numbers where we may reach you.

Thank you for your contribution to aviation safety.

NOTE: AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS SHOULD NOT BE REPORTED ON THIS FORM. SUCH EVENTS SHOULD BE FILED WITH THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD AS REQUIRED BY NTSB Regulation 39.5 - 49CFR39.5.

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NASA AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM
 POST OFFICE BOX 125
 MOFFETT FIELD CALIFORNIA 94035-0125

If you wish to submit online, click the Submit button at the bottom of page 2 of 3 when on-line.

DESCRIBE EVENT/SITUATION

Report on and the facts show, rather than those which are presumed and anything else you think is relevant to the event. Do not include the name of the aircraft or the name of the pilot or the name of the operator. Do not include the name of the pilot or the name of the operator. Do not include the name of the pilot or the name of the operator.

I was working Ground Control Two (GC2) at the end of the NWA evening arrival push. Memphis was in a South Configuration, landing RWY 18L, 18R and RWY 27. MES3057 was next to land on RWY 27, and NWA 1593 was next to land on RWY 18L. Both aircraft would contact me after landing, so their parking locations and call signs were notated on a paper pad at my position.

As MES3057 crossed the numbers to land on RWY 27, the pilot informed Local Control Two (LC2) that he had an "unsafe gear indication", and that he was "going around". NWA1593 was approximately 1/2 mile final descending to land on RWY 18L. The LC2 Controller instructed MES3057 to "... stay low, stay low!", and then immediately went to NWA1593 and issued go around instructions to prevent these two aircraft from colliding. MES3057 flew down the length of RWY 27 at approximately 10 feet AGL, and flew directly underneath NWA1593.

Only some luck and the quick action by the LC2 Controller prevented a midair collision from taking place. If the frequency had been in use by another aircraft calling for landing or departure clearance; or if the LC2 Controller had been distracted with landline communications; or if the Tower radios had failed as they have done recently at MEM Tower and TRACON, the results might have been different.

Many Controllers at MEM have experienced RWY 27 "go around" situations at MEM, and all have recounted horror stories of these aircraft flying through the flight paths of aircraft landing RWY 18L, 18C and 18R. This is a landing configuration that MUST STOP. We have "Operational Error Reduction Plans"; new procedures; new airspace; and Computer Based instruction provided, all in an effort to keep the system safe. Yet, we continue to place aircraft, passengers and cargo in the dangerous situation of "going around" on RWY 27 and flying through the flight path of other landing traffic.

Our Air Traffic Manager (William K. "Bill" Wertz) informed us just last week in a Team Briefing, that MEM would continue to use RWY 27 in this configuration "because it helps the users make money". We are placing profit

DESCRIBE EVENT/SITUATION, continued.

over safety against the objections of many Controllers who are forced to deal with this unsafe situation on a daily basis.

I would like to see the FAA, NASA and the NTSB get involved BEFORE we have a midair collision involving a go around on RWY 27 with an aircraft landing on RWY 18L, 18C or 18R.

MEM, FEB-2007

From: Peter Nesbitt <sailing_blues@yahoo.com>

Subject: **Runway Safety Forum**

Date: February 21, 2007 5:41:49 PM CST

To: daniel.bartlett@ntsb.gov, hollowk@ntsb.gov, peduzzi@ntsb.gov

Bcc: Shaw Dan

Dear Members of the NTSB,

I am employee with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as an Air Traffic Controller. My 20 years of experience has provided me with the opportunity to work at five different Air Traffic Control facilities. During this time I have worked under a number of unique FAA Managers and Supervisors, and I have witnessed the development and implementation of numerous airspace and procedure changes. I would often say that I've "seen it all", but that all changed when I transferred to the Memphis Tower/TRACON two years ago.

We have an operation that allows aircraft to land on Runways 18L, 18C and 18R, while at the same time allowing aircraft to land and depart on Runway 27. This crossing runway does not intersect the parallel runways, but it does exist north of these runways. We supposedly have an "FAA Waiver" to conduct this operation, but I have never seen such a document. FAA Evaluators have witnessed this operation and have generally been appalled at what they saw. From what I've been told, our MEM Management informed the evaluators that MEM has a waiver to conduct these simultaneous operations.

Just last week while working Ground Control in the Tower, I observed a Mesaba SF34 execute a go-around on Runway 27 due to an "unsafe gear indication light" in the cockpit. This announcement was made to the Local Controller as the aircraft crossed the landing threshold of the runway. At the very instant that this was taking place, a Northwest DC9 was on short final for Runway 18L. The alert Local Controller directed the SF34 to "Stay low, stay low!", and then immediately issued go-around instructions to the DC9. The SF34 hugged the deck at less than 10 feet AGL, while the DC9 climbed out directly over the SF34. I estimate the vertical separation to have been 500 feet or less.

There are numerous instances of aircraft at MEM executing a go-around on Runway 27 and conflicting with other traffic that is landing on Runways 18L, 18C or 18R. The most famous of these go around incidents involves an AirTrans B712 flying "low" down the length of Runway 27 directly underneath a FDX Heavy jet was was simultaneously issued go-around instructions for Runway 18R. Witnesses in the Tower Cab say that it

is the closest that they have ever seen two aircraft get in the air. Other go-around stories witnessed by my peers involve the go-around aircraft flying underneath a 18L arrival and climbing out over a 18R arrival.

Another dangerous aspect of Runway 27 involves the FDX midnight operation. MEM will land on Runways 36L, 36C and 36R, while at the same time land and depart on Runway 27. Each aircraft that lands on one of the parallel runways must cross the active Runway 27 between numerous arriving and departing aircraft. Just imagine 100+ aircraft hitting the gap between arrivals on Runway 27 at six different taxiway intersections.

During the FDX midnight outbound, Memphis will generally depart Runways 18L, 18C and 18R, while at the same time departing selected aircraft off of Runway 27. The vast majority of the FDX fleet will cross the active Runway 27 in between arriving and departing aircraft. Three weeks ago I witnessed an instance where an aircraft was about to be cleared for takeoff from Runway 27, but an alert Ground Controller yelled out that there was still one other aircraft that had a clearance to cross Runway 27. Several months ago I witnessed a trainee issue a clearance to a FDX Heavy jet to cross Runway 27 with another aircraft on short final to Runway 27.

Fortunately, no error resulted in the above examples, but it was only quick reaction by the Air Traffic Controllers that prevented a disaster. Examples like this are abundant at Memphis, and everyone can recount an instance where a pilot or Controller has made an error involving an arriving or departing aircraft on Runway 27 with an aircraft crossing Runway 27 during the outbound.

In years past there existed a dedicated group of individuals who worked the midnight shift every night. These Air Traffic Controllers volunteered for the midnight shift. Over time they became the most knowledgeable and experienced Controllers with regards to the FDX midnight operation involving Runway 27. All of this changed when our Air Traffic Manager changed our work schedule in 2007. The midnight crew was dismantled, and nearly all Memphis Air Traffic Controllers now rotate through the midnight shift once a week. Some of these Controllers had not worked the FDX midnight operation in over 10 years. I was certified as a Cab Coordinator without having ever worked the Cab Coordinator position during the midnight operation.

Please take a moment to compare the idea of these two groups of individuals: Group one worked the FDX midnight operation each night for years on end -- they were very familiar and experienced with the operation. Group two now rotates unfamiliar Controllers through this operation once each week, never truly gaining the level of competence and experience that existed with the permanent midnight crew.

Recently several Controllers have spoken about the Runway 27 safety concerns with our Supervisors and Air Traffic Managers. These discussions have taken place in the formal setting of weekly "Team Briefings". We have voiced concerns with the new rotating schedule that forces us to work two "quick turn" shift each week, one of which involves a midnight shift; we have voice concerns with the many aircraft that cross Runway 27 between the many arrivals and departures; we have voice concerns with the level of alertness in which all of this takes place at 3:00 a.m. after having worked two quick turns in the previous 36 hours. Our Air Traffic Manager, Operations Managers and Training Manager have all indicated that we will continue to use Runway 27 in this configuration because it "helps FDX make money".

Money over safety. Is that our goal? Our job? Our commitment to the National Airspace System?

I respectfully ask the NTSB to consider the Runway 27 operation at Memphis. Someone needs to look at this operation and put an end to it, because there will be an accident here someday. There have simply been too many close calls here where only luck or some quick reaction by a human has averted disaster.

I do have some reservations about my name being attached to this concern/complaint, as I fear retaliation from the FAA and my Air Traffic Manager (Bill Wertz) for speaking out about this issue. Local FAA Management at Memphis simply refuse to discuss the concerns of the Air Traffic Controllers regarding Runway 27, but something needs to be done.

Sincerely,



Peter D. Nesbitt (NT)
Memphis Tower / TRACON
sailing_blues@yahoo.com
512-791-7089

EXHIBIT (4)

To Whom It May Concern,

Sometime during 2002, I cannot remember the exact date or month, I was working the Arrival West radar at Memphis. We were in a 17/27 runway setup. We would normally have been using 18R/27 but 18R was under construction and a temporary runway, 17, was established on taxiway Mike.

I happened to observe a go-around on runway 27 and on 17 simultaneously. I can only imagine how bad it looked out the window because it did not look pretty on radar. The local controllers later told me that the FDX MD11 had actually flown under the TRS B717. It was shortly after this incident that facility management ceased the 17/27 operation on the mid and had us run to the parallel runways with the jets, citing safety as the reason for the change.

I have also observed on numerous occasions while working in the Tower during the 18L/27 runway configuration many a runway 27 arrival roll down the runway at high rates of speed, and definitely not at taxi speed, so that they may exit at Taxiway November and proceed straight to their gate on the West side of the terminal. Sometimes these aircraft roll just in front of or just behind the 18L arrival. I do not have any exact dates for said occurrences, just my memories of these instances. Each time I think what would happen if the runway 27 arrival would go around.

I have questioned the validity of this operation only to be told it was legal in accordance with our local procedures and associated waiver, as long as the runway 27 arrival was at taxi speed as it passed the 18L final approach course. Of course, what defines taxi speed?

John Wallin
Air Traffic Controller
Memphis Tower

ONE OF (8) EXHIBITS GIVEN TO
FAA MANAGEMENT ON 5/7/07

EXHIBIT (5)

May 5, 2007

To Whom It May Concern:

I have been an air traffic controller at Memphis Tower for over 12 years. Like most controllers arriving at Memphis Tower, I questioned the Runway 18L, 18C and Runway 27 operation. I was told that there was a waiver for this operation.